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Abstract  
Software provide services that may come with some vulnerabilities or risks. Attackers perform actions that break security of 
system through threats and cause a failure. To avoid security vulnerability, there are many security-specific concepts that 
should be determined as requirements during software development life cycle in order to deliver a strong and secure 
software. This paper first, survey a number of existing processes, life cycle and methodologies needed for developing secure 
software based on the related published works. It starts by presenting the most relevant Secure Software Development 
Lifecycles, a comparison between the main security features for each process is proposed. The results of the comparison 
will give the software developer with a guideline which will help on selecting the best secure process. Second, the paper list 
a set of the most widely used specification languages with the advantages and disadvantages for each. 
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1. Introduction  
A secure software is the software where unauthorized person cannot access it, modify it, or attack it. The degree of such 
security is measured by the existing number of security vulnerabilities. The software with no vulnerabilities is a high secure 
software, where the software with at least one vulnerability is insecure software [1].  
In order to include security in the software engineering, the security aspects should be included from the beginning of the 
software development life cycle. The secure software engineering is the process of designing, building, and testing software 
so that it becomes secure, this includes secure software development life cycle (SSDLC) processes and secure software 
development (SSD) methods. A SSDLC process considers security aspects of the software during the development life 
cycle by using SSD methods. SSD methods include, among others, security specification languages, security requirements 
engineering processes, and software security assurance methods [24].  
The importance of including security on the software developing comes from the high cost of removing system errors which 
may cause a security vulnerability after developing. 
This paper survey a set of secure software development life cycle processes, identify the characteristics for each one, and 
presents a comparison between them based on the security activities that are included in the development lifecycle, this will 
be useful for the software developers by helping him choosing the correct process. 
1.1 Software Security Goals 
There are three principal dimensions to achieve security in the computer system, confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. These three aspects also are referred as CIA. 
Confidentiality means to disclose information to people or programs that are authorized to have access to that 
information.  
Integrity, assures that a system performs its intended function in an unimpaired manner, free from deliberate 
or inadvertent unauthorized manipulation of the system.  
Availability, assures that systems work promptly, and service is not denied to authorized users. 
Threats to the confidentiality of the system can disclose information to people or programs that are not 
authorized to have access to that information. Threats to the integrity of the system and its data can damage or 
corrupt the software or its data. Threats to the availability of the system and its data can restrict access to the 
software or its data for authorized users.  
Over the years, different security mechanism was used to achieve these goals like authentication and 
authorization. But the rate of attacks to computer system is increasing, and the situation may be critical 
especially for large systems. Because of that, many researchers pay attention on the software security field in 
order to produce a high secure system.  
1.2 Software Security Basic Concepts  
This section will explain some of security terms that are used in this paper. 
1. Asset: Is anything that has value to the organization, its business operations and their continuity, including 
information resources that support the organization's mission. 
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2. Vulnerability: A weakness in the design, operation, implementation or any process in the system which expose the 
system to a threat. [10] defined it as a weakness of an asset or group of assets that can be exploited by one or 
more attacker. 
3. Threat: A possible danger that may result in harm of systems and organization.  
4. Attack: An actual event done by a person; attacker to harm as asset of the software through exploiting a 
vulnerability. 
5. Risk: a potential for loss, damage, or destruction of an asset as a result of a threat exploiting a vulnerability. 
6. Software Security Requirement: is a non-functional requirement that elicit a control, constraint, safeguard, or 
countermeasure to avoid or remove security vulnerabilities from requirements, design or code [24-26]. 
7. Confidentiality: means to disclose information to people or programs that are authorized to have access to that 
information. 
8. Integrity: assures that a system performs its intended function in an unimpaired manner, free from deliberate or 
inadvertent unauthorized manipulation of the system. 
9. Availability: assures that systems work promptly, and service is not denied to authorized users. 
10. Process: is an instance of a computer program that is being executed.  
11. Secure software process: is a set of activities used to develop and deliver a secure software solution. 
2. Secure Software Development Life Cycle processes 
The stages of the software development are: 
1. Requirements definition and specification 
2. Design document containing system abstraction and their relationships 
3. Coding, Programming components of the system 
4. System testing 
5. Implementation and Maintenance 
Adding the security activities to software development life cycle will in general include the following in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Security in the SCLC 
There are a set of secure software development methods that had been proposed to add security concept to the software. 
The software development life cycle is used to develop software and the security activities are added in different phases 
according to the specific method. This section summarizes a literature review for the most popular secure software 
development process.  
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1. McGraw’s Secure Software Development Life Cycle Process [2,3] 
To build a secure software, McGraw suggests 7 touchpoint activity areas, connecting to software development artefacts. In 
lifecycle order: 
 Abuse cases (in requirements), describe the desired behavior of the system under different kinds of abuse 
 Security requirements (in requirements), identify functional security requirements  
 Architectural Risk analysis (in design), considers security during design  
 Risk-based security tests (in test planning), test security functionality using a standard method  
 Code review and repair (in coding), eliminate problems  
 Penetration testing (in testing and deployment), find real problems  
 Security operations (during deployment), managing the security of the deployed software  
Figure 1 shows the life cycle security touch points. 
 
Figure 1: McGraw’s Secure Software Development Life Cycle Process 
2. Microsoft’s Trustworthy Computing Security Development Lifecycle (MS SDL) 
Microsoft’s Trustworthy Computing Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) is a process developed be Microsoft to add a 
series of secure activity to each phase of Microsoft’s software development process as follows: during requirement phase, 
the security feature requirements are defined based on the customer demands, in the design phase the MS SDL suggests 
a set of activities to be performed such as threat modeling for security risk identification, identifying components that are 
critical to security or needs special attention during testing. In the implementation phase, use of static analysis code-scanning 
tools and code reviews. After completing implementation, the complete software is tested focusing on the security critical 
components of the software during the testing phase. A final code review of new as well as legacy code is used during 
verification phase. And finally, during the release phase, a Final Security Review is conducted by the Central Microsoft 
Security team [4,12,13]. The overall process is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Microsoft’s Trustworthy Computing Security Development Lifecycle 
3. Team Software Process for Secure Software Development (TSP Secure) 
TCP process is specifically designed for software teams, to build a high-performance team and help them in plan their work 
to achieve the best performance. The TSP Secure focuses directly on the security of software in three ways: planning, 
development and management, and training for developers about security related aspects and other team members.  In the 
initial phase; planning, the team identify security risks, security requirements, secure design, code review, use of static 
analysis tools, unit tests, and Fuzz testing, and produce a detailed plan to be used in the development phase during a series 
of meetings. Next, the plan is executed, and the team ensure that all the security activities are taken place [14]. TSP security 
strategy has multiple defect removal point during SDLC, which enables problems to be easily removed. Figure 3 shows 
defect removal activity in the software development life cycle. 
 
Figure 3: Vulnerability Removal Filters 
Every time defects are remove, they are measured. The measurement points help the team to know where they stand 
against their goals, helps them decide whether to move to the next step or to stop and take corrective action, and indicates 
where to fix their process to meet their goals.  
The team considers the following questions when managing defects:  
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 What type of defects lead to security vulnerabilities?  
 Where in the software development life cycle should defects be measured?  
 What work products should be examined for defects?  
 What tools and methods should be used to measure the defects?  
 How many defects can be removed at each step?  
 How many estimated defects remain after each removal step?  
 TSP-Secure includes training for developers, managers, and other team members [33]. 
4. Agile Methods 
Agile is a new family in the software engineering which include extreme programming, scrum, Crystal Methodologies, Lean 
Software Development, Feature Driven Development, and Dynamic Systems Development Methodology. All of these 
methods that fall under the umbrella of  “Agile”, are different in their methodology, but they are all have some common 
principles, such as short development iterations, minimal design upfront, emergent design and architecture, collective code 
ownership and ability for anyone to change any part of the code, direct communication and minimal or no documentation 
(the code is the documentation), and gradual building of test cases [15]. In order to add security to the agile method, the 
security requirements must be adaptable and simple. [16] listed in his article “Towards Agile Security Assurance,” a table 
that shows the compatibility of common security assurance activities with Agile methods. It shows that almost 50% of 
traditional security assurance activities are not compatible with Agile methods (12 out of 26), less than 10% are natural fits 
(2 out of 26), about 30% are independent of development method, and slightly more than 10% (4 out of 26) could be semi-
automated and thus integrated more easily into the Agile methods. 
5. Secure Software Development Process Model (S2D-ProM) 
Is a strategy oriented process model that provide the developers and software engineers from beginners to experts with a 
guidance support that cover most resources and knowledge need to develop a secure software. The process provides two 
level of guidance, the first one is strategic which helps the developers choosing one among several strategies. The second 
level guidance is tactical helping developers achieving their selection for producing secure software [17]. 
It gives the developers with more than one option while advancing from one phase to another in order to achieve flexibility 
and extensibility in the secure software development process [17]. The security development process here is intention 
oriented. At any moment, the engineer has an intention, a goal in mind that he wants to fulfill. 
6. Comprehensive, Lightweight Application Security Process (CLASP) 
Is a lightweight process, consists of 24 top-level security related activities that can be fully or partially incorporated into 
software that is being constructed during software development life cycle [18]. Each CLASP Activity is divided into discrete 
process components and linked to one or more specific project roles, this provides a guidance to project participant and 
results in incremental improvements for security in the software life cycle. For example, threat modeling and risk analysis 
are performed during requirement and design phase [19]. In the design and implementation phase, it suggests secure design 
guidelines and secure coding standards [20-23]. inspections, static code analysis, and security testing are performed in the 
assurance phase. Figure 4 shows the 24 activities of CLASP. 
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Figure 4: CLASP security activity role mapping 
7. Correctness by Construction [12] 
The Correctness by Construction methodology developed by Praxis Critical Systems is a process for developing high-
integrity software [33]. It has been used to develop safety-critical and security-critical systems with a great degree of success 
[34]. Correctness by Construction is based on the following tenets:  do not introduce errors in the first place and remove any 
errors as close as possible to the point that they are introduced. 
The process is based on the strong belief that each step should serve a clear purpose and be carried out using the most 
rigorous techniques available to address that particular problem. Specifically, the process almost always uses formal 
methods to specify behavioral, security, and safety properties of the software.  The belief is that only by using formality can 
the necessary precision be achieved.    
The seven key principles of Correctness by Construction are:  
1. Expect requirements to change.  Changing requirements are managed by adopting an incremental approach and 
paying increased attention to design to accommodate change.  Apply more rigor, rather than less, to avoid costly 
and unnecessary rework.  
2. Know why you’re testing.  Recognize that there are two distinct forms of testing, one to build correct software 
(debugging) and another to show that the software built is correct (verification).  These two forms of testing require 
two very different approaches.  
3. Eliminate errors before testing.  Better yet, deploy techniques that make it difficult to introduce errors in the first 
place.  Testing is the second most expensive way of finding errors.  The most expensive is to let your customers 
find them for you.  
4. Write software that is easy to verify.  If you don’t, verification and validation (including testing) can take up to 60% 
of the total effort.  Coding typically takes only 10%.  Even doubling the effort on coding will be worthwhile, if it 
reduces the burden of verification by as little as 20%.  
5. Develop incrementally.  Make very small changes, incrementally.  After each change, verify that the updated system 
behaves according to its updated specification.  Making small changes makes the software much easier to verify.  
6. Some aspects of software development are just plain hard.  There is no silver bullet.  Don’t expect any tool or 
method to make everything easy.  The best tools and methods take care of the easy problems, allowing you to 
focus on the difficult problems. 
7. Software is not useful by itself.  The executable software is only part of the picture.  It is of no use without user 
manuals, business processes, design documentation, well commented source code and test cases.   
These should be produced as an intrinsic part of the development, not added at the end. In particular, recognize that 
design documentation serves two distinct purposes:  
 To allow the developers to get from a set of requirements to an implementation.  Much of this type of documentation 
outlives its usefulness after implementation.  
 To allow the maintainers to understand how the implementation satisfies the requirements.  A document aimed at 
maintainers is much shorter, cheaper to produce and more useful than a traditional design document. 
8. Appropriate and Effective Guidance for Information Security (AEGIS) 
This process based on the spiral model, it integrates into normal software engineering lifecycles, as can be seen in its 
application to the Spiral model of software development as shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: AEGIS Spiral Model of Software Development 
The process identifies security requirements first by determining system assets and their relationships, then risk analysis in 
which vulnerabilities, threats and risks are identified [5, 31]. 
9. The Secure Software Development Model (SSDM) 
This model incorporates various security activities into a waterfall software development life cycle model, as shown in Figure 
6. The security training provides adequate security education to stakeholders in software development. Threat model 
identifies attackers and their capabilities and is performed during requirements phase. After that, security specification must 
be defined by stating the guidelines on how security will be achieved. Penetration Testing is the only SSD activity for the 
security assurance phase where Capabilities of the software in preventing attacks are tested here [6, 30],  
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Figure 6: Secure Software Development Model (SSDM) [6] 
10. Security Quality Requirements Engineering (SQUARE) methodology 
This model initially focuses on building security concepts at the early stages of the software development cycle. It provides 
a means for eliciting, categorizing, and prioritizing security requirements for information technology systems and 
applications. The final output of SQUARE is a security requirements document that is designed to satisfy the security goals 
of the organization [7]. Then, it has been enhanced into SQUARE+R [8] to incorporate risk analysis in all phases of the 
development to ensure security. It uses a static and dynamic code analysis tools for the security assurance phase. 
3. Comparison of existing secure software development life cycle process SSDLC 
This section presents the strengths and weakness point for each SSDLC with a comparison between them according to the 
activities that should be added during development life cycle to develop a secure software. The secure activities that can be 
added to each phase in the software development life cycle are listed below in table 1. 
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  Table 1: security activities for each phase in the software development life cycle 
requirement  
engineering 
Design Implementation Security 
Assurance 
Resources 
1. Threat modeling 
activity 
2. Requirement 
specification 
review activity 
3. security 
requirement 
specification 
language 
4. risk analysis 
1. design guideline 
and secure 
design pattern 
2. identify possible 
software threats 
3. review activity 
4. errors and 
threats 
identification 
5. risk analysis 
1. Secure 
programmin
g language 
selection 
1. security 
static 
analysis 
2. security 
code 
review 
 
1. Use secure 
resources 
2. configuration review 
3. network 
configuration review 
The details of each activity are: 
1. Secure software development activities for requirement engineering  
A Software Requirement Specification or SRS is a document which records expected behavior of the system or 
software that needs to be developed. 
Each SSDLC should specify the use of SSD activities for each (i.e., requirements engineering, design, 
implementation, and security assurance), in order to develop a secure software, the recommended activities should 
be added to each phase in the software development life cycle phases. For requirement engineering phase different 
secure activity must be found as follow 
1) Threat modeling activity which refers to identify possible threats that can attack the software, so that 
appropriate security feature must take into consideration through requirement specification phase. 
2) Requirement specification review activity, through this activity security error was specified. 
3) Use of security requirement specification language to specify security requirement which can help to remove 
identified language. 
4) Evaluation for security state of requirement specification using risk analysis to prioritize the identified security 
requirements. 
All upper activities must be used through first phase of software development life cycle to achieve secure requirement 
specification, some of current models used some of these activities and some other model does not use them, and 
many processes recommend a similar set of SSD methods to be used during requirements engineering.  Almost all the 
SSDLC processes (except SSAI [27] and MS SDL [4, 13]) perform threat modeling and/or risk analysis during the 
requirements specification phase. Moreover, all processes except SSAI and SSDM recommend defining security 
features to mitigate identified threats. 
2- secure software development through design phase. 
Second phase of software development life cycle refer to design phase, through this phase different activities must be take 
into account to be found through this phase to achieve secure software development, these activities are as follow: 
1) Through entail design development the secure design guideline and secure design pattern must be followed, and 
secure design decision should be specified using secure design specification language. 
2) Must identify possible software threats by performing threat modeling on the initial design phase, where this activity 
was different from that which found on requirement phase because the data or information through this phase was 
more than that on previous requirement phase. 
3) Design review activity which refers to review design phase to make sure that no security error was found, where 
error that can be found here on this phase was caused by requirement specification phase error, for that all error 
on previous phase must be fixed. 
4) Errors and threats identifications must be used as a basis to security requirement specification for design phase. 
5) To prioritize security requirements for design phase the risk analysis should be performed [2, 26]. 
Some processes take into consideration these activities during its design phase such as MS SDL [29] and CALSP [18], 
both provide comprehensive set of SSD methods for design phase.  
3- Security activity in implementation phase  
Secure programming language selection is the important step to achieve secure implementation phase, through following a 
secure coding standard and standard guideline, some model suggest that implementation using secure language to achieve 
      I S S N  2 2 7 7 - 3 0 6 1  
V o l u m e  1 6  N u m b e r  7  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  j o u r n a l  o f  C o m p u t e r s  a n d  T e c h n o l o g y  
7 0 5 6  |  P a g e                                                  D e c e m b e r ,  2 0 1 7  
http://cirworld.com/                                                                                           DOI: 10.24297/ijct.v16i7.6467 
secure implementation, like Apvrille and Pourzandi [11], and S2D-ProM [17], where some other suggest to use secure 
coding standard guideline to achieve secure implementation like MS SDL [4, 13], SecSDM [6, 30], McGraw’s SSDLC 
process [2], S2D-ProM, CLASP [18], MS SDL goes further and suggests that certain security assurance activities should be 
performed during implementation. 
4- SSD Activities for Security Assurance and Testing 
Some activities must be taken into account through testing and security assurance process, vulnerability assessment and 
fuzzing must be implemented on testing phase also security static analysis using code scanning tools and security code 
review after finishing the coding or implementation phase. We must note that all these activities do not guarantee security 
of software but identify errors and vulnerability. Different models of SDLC models use these activities for testing phase such 
as the exception of AEGIS [5, 31], SSDM [6], and SecSDM [30], all the processes recommend using multiple security 
assurance methods such as security testing, code reviews, static code analysis. 
5- secure development resources. 
To achieve secure software development, a secure resource should be available for development process, where the 
resources can be possible mitigations for each error or vulnerability, where this knowledge will be helpful to avoid errors that 
can lead to vulnerabilities in the first place [31]. Other important point on secure development resource phase to review 
different resources as do server configuration review and network configuration review, these two steps avoid vulnerability 
which come from the network and resources. 
Figure 7 summarize the secure activities that can be added to the software development life cycle. Table 3 summarize a 
comparison of SSDLC processes according to security activities in each phase of the development cycle phases. 
 
Figure 7: secure development for software development life cycle 
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Table 3: comparison of SSDLC processes 
 SSD 
activities for 
requirement 
engineering 
SSD activities for 
Design 
SSD activities 
for 
Implementation 
SSD 
activities 
for Security 
Assurance 
  Resources 
McGraw’s 
SDL 
Identify 
security 
requirements 
risk analysis None using abuse 
cases and 
security 
requirements 
Secure design 
guidelines 
MS SDL identify 
security 
objectives 
and required 
security 
features. The 
identification of the 
components that are 
critical to security, 
identification of 
design 
techniques/guidelines 
following the 
secure coding 
standards 
security 
code reviews 
and security 
testing 
Secure design 
guidelines 
TSP Secure Threat 
modeling. 
Specification 
of abuse 
cases. Risk 
Analysis 
Design patterns. 
State machine design 
and verification 
Following 
secure 
programming 
standards and 
guidelines 
Fuzz testing. 
Penetration 
testing. Use 
of static 
code 
analysis 
tools. Code 
reviews 
None 
Agile Guidelines. 
Specification 
analysis. 
Review. 
Use secure design 
principles. 
Formal and informal 
validation. 
external review 
Informal 
requirement 
traceability. 
High level 
programming 
and tools 
 
Security 
testing. 
Vulnerability 
and 
penetration 
testing. 
None 
S2D-ProM Following 
security 
standards. 
Risk analysis. 
Identification 
of errors. 
Specification 
of security 
features 
Using security 
modeling language, 
security patterns. 
Risk analysis. Design 
reviews. Model 
checking 
Following 
secure coding 
standards. Use 
of a secure 
programming 
language 
Risk 
analysis. 
Code 
reviews. Use 
of static 
code 
analysis 
tools. 
None 
CLASP Risk analysis. 
Threat 
Modeling. 
Identification 
of attackers 
and attack 
surface. 
Specification 
of misuse 
cases with 
their 
mitigations, 
security 
features. 
Following design 
guidelines. 
Annotation of class 
diagrams with 
security information. 
Threat modeling. 
Risk analysis 
Following 
secure coding 
guidelines 
Code 
reviews. Use 
of static 
code 
analysis 
tools. 
Security 
testing 
Secure design 
and 
implementation 
guidelines. A 
comprehensive 
list of more 
than 200 types 
of 
vulnerabilities 
with their 
possible 
mitigations. 
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Correctness 
by 
Construction 
Requirements 
are identified 
using the 
formal 
specification 
notation Z 
Develop 
incrementally 
SPARK Debugging 
and 
verification 
formal. 
methods. 
Formal 
methods 
AEGIS identifying 
assets and 
performing 
risk analysis 
Design activity 
according to 
requirements 
None  None None 
SSDM Threat 
modeling. 
Specification 
of security 
policy 
Following the security 
policy. 
None Penetration 
testing. 
None 
SQUARE eliciting, 
categorizing, 
and 
prioritizing 
security 
requirements 
None None static and 
dynamic 
code 
analysis 
tools. 
 
None 
3.1 Ten ways to infuse security into your software development life cycle 
Implement security measure should be a top of priority to ensure the security level of the developed software; the following 
ways can help on producing secure software as follow: 
- Asses Land Space, by do requirement gathering and good understood what the customer need by determine scope 
and boundaries, and by identify the stockholder to define what they want, and other by identify the process gaps. 
- Incorporate industry standard security model for software development process through requirement gathering 
process, based on this step secure software will be built from the beginning of development and this way will be 
cost effective to not repeat the test of the program more than one time if this development does not achieve security 
level recommended from the customer. 
- Educate personal on software security; this can be done through training or deployment phase to educate the 
customer who will use the software for security property of software and how to avoid unsafe actions which will 
affect the security level for the program. 
- Perform security on the phase of requirement gathering, though this step we must incorporate security on initial 
steps of security development phases to insure of producing secure software as performing initial risk analysis 
during requirement gathering phase to promote security activities in addition phases within SDLC. 
- Initiate institute for a comprehensive risk management analysis, this institute will help on identifying major risk and 
execute a mitigation plane, this institute have responsibility like ensure proper security design, ensure effectiveness 
guide in SDLC execution. 
- Perform architecture review and threat modeling, this way implemented through design phase of SDLC phases, 
this step is important to identify different threats and risk on early stage of development which will be cost effective 
when identify it here rather than identity it later one software was developed, different critical tool for detect design 
flaws as analyzing fundamental design principle and assign the attack surface, enumerating various threat agents 
and other identifying weakness and gaps in security controls.  
- Doing code review during implementation phase, this step is complete step for using secure coding standard and 
static code analysis performing secure coding review as a condition for pass of development of software as secure 
software development.  
- Execute test plane and perform penetration test through verification phase of software development life cycle 
phases, this step other important to make sure that the developed product perform as expected in runtime scenario. 
Last step refers to Deploy Software product through deployment phase of SDLC this is essential to successful release to 
production through QA and acceptance testing are completed 
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4. Specification languages for software security 
The specification languages are a way used to detect existing vulnerabilities by simulating different conditions of attacks 
and its securities. In this section, we introduce some of these specification languages. 
4.1 Definitions related to specification languages 
1. Use Case Diagram 
Is a graphic description that defines system’s user and activities and the interaction between them.  
2. Activity Diagram 
Is a behavioral diagram that represent the workflow of the system. It describes the flow from one activity to another. 
3. Class Diagram 
Is a structural diagram for a particular system. It describes classes, packages, associations and interfaces. It is widely used 
in the object-oriented system 
4. Abuse case 
It describes the interaction between actor and activity, where interaction is harmful.  
5. Misuse Case 
The case that should not be happening in the system. It is used to detect system vulnerabilities. 
6. Attack Language 
Is the language that is used to describe, recognize, react and report an attack. 
7. Specification Language 
Describes what the system should do. what data to be processed. Check requirements and verify system validation. 
4.2 Different Specification Languages 
In this section, we will introduce the most widely used specification languages. 
1. STATL  
Is an extended finite state machine-based executable attack specification language, proposed in 2002 by Eckmann et al 
[35], it represents an attack by using states and transitions where  states represent a different characteristic of an attack 
and transition connects two states. Each transition must have associated event which when occurs fires the transition. And 
each transition may have a code to be executed when fired. STATL is a language to support misuse detection and is widely 
used in network-based attacks and host-based attacks [36]. 
2. UMLSec  
UMLSec is an extension of UML language, it is developed by Jurjens et al [37] in 2002. Its main purpose is to focus on 
specifying role-based access control policies which can be considered as security requirements to help in the development 
of a security-critical system. It provides 9 stereotypes to turn normal UML language into security purpose language. 
3. UMLIntr 
UMLintr is an extension of UML, proposed in 2006 by Hussein et al., and uses use case diagrams, class diagrams, state 
charts, and package diagrams to specify attacks [38]. The attack scenarios are described in misuse state machine. 
4. Abstract State Machine Language (AsmL) 
Is an extended finite state machine-based executable software specification language, and used to specify attack scenario. 
This attack scenarios can be automatically translated into Snort rules which can then be used with an extension of the IDS 
Snort. Such attack scenarios are able to capture more attacks with multiple steps using context information [41]. 
5. AsmlSec 
Is an extension of specification language Asml [39], and proposed by Raihan et al. in 2007 [40]. Some features were missing 
in Asml to represent different attacks. AsmlSec integrated those missing features with Asml by adding states and transitions. 
States are different situations of an attack and transitions are different events that trigger another state. A transition can only 
take place if guard or condition is satisfied. If a system reaches any state, which is an attack state then the system generate 
an alert [36]. 
6. Snort Rules 
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It uses attacks scenarios specified as rules to detect attacks over the network. It specifies what action should be taken if the 
rule is matched to a network packet, the source and destination IP addresses and ports, the protocol of the observed 
network, and direction of network packet. A number of options can also be specified. These options range from logging a 
message to searching for a particular string in the packet [42]. 
4.3 Comparison of Existing Security Specification Languages 
Table 4 summarize the advantages and disadvantages for each specification language [36]. 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
STATL 1. can represent domain 
independent attack scenarios 
2. can represent a large range of 
network and host-based 
attacks 
3. It can relate previous attacks to 
detect or predict new attacks 
1. its own syntax only can be understood 
by experts. 
2. To work with STATL, Secure Software 
developer has to learn a new 
language. 
UMLSec 1. Fair Exchange: In e-commerce 
fair exchange is very important. 
It protects the buyer and seller 
from cheating. Fair exchange 
ensures that, if payment is 
made then the buyer will 
receive his product or he will 
get his money back.  
2. Secure Information Flow: It 
checks whether the information 
is leaked. Even a small amount 
of leaked information can be 
used to regenerate full 
information. 
3. Secure Communication Link: It 
ensures that communication 
between multiple users is 
secure against intruders. 
4. Confidentiality: It checks that 
resources will be only 
accessed by authorized party. 
1. UMLSec mainly worked on validation 
and requirement, check of the system 
2. Some stereotypes functionalities only 
work if the exact string is used in the 
action name of a UML diagram 
 
UMLIntr 1. UMLIntr introduced 8 tagged 
values. It is possible to 
represent skill of the attacker, 
security level of the victim, the 
severity level of the attack, the 
exploitation method of the 
attack, the action of the 
attacker, events needed to 
detect attack, gained access 
level of the attack and initial 
access level of attacker by 
using this tagged value. 
2. UMLIntr added 19 stereotypes 
1. UMLIntr has a stereotype that can 
represent only four attacks (DoS 
attack, Remote to user attack, User to 
root attack, Probing attack) but other 
attacks (e.g.: distributed denial of 
service, side channel attack, 
Cloudbased attack etc.) cannot be 
presented 
2. UMLIntr is only suitable for detecting 
Intrusion but not for other security 
demands like verification, validation, 
authorization 
AsmL 1. Can represent usage senareo 
2. Tool support 
1. Can not Formulate Basic Security 
Requirements 
2. Can not represent security mechanism  
AsmlSec 1. Use the state transition 
diagram to represent an attack. 
1. Can not directly read HTTP packets 
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It is easier to understand attack 
states and conditions of attack 
from a transition 
2. AsmlSec has its own compiler 
which generates attack 
signatures from AsmlSec 
specification 
3. AsmlSec tested on DARPA 
datasets to represent CrashIIS 
attack signatures, which was 
successful 
2. AsmlSec does not support regular 
expression 
3. Documentation is hard to read 
Snort Rules 1. Can represent usage senareo 
2. Tool support 
1. Can not Formulate Basic Security 
Requirements 
2. Can not represent sequrity 
mechanism 
  
5. Security Software Testing 
Security testing is an important to identify vulnerabilities and ensure security functionality. It is about testing of security 
requirements related to security properties like confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, authorization, and non-
repudiation. To achieve that, many techniques can be used, this section will provide an overview of the recent security 
testing techniques. 
a. Risk Analysis 
Risk analysis is done during design phase in order to review security requirements and to identify security risks. Threat 
modelling is a methodical process to identify threats and vulnerabilities in software. It is recommended that application have 
a threat model developed and documented, and created as early as possible in the SDLC [50]. 
b. Model-Based Security Testing 
It is an approach that validate software system requirements that are related to security properties. It combines security 
properties like confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, authorization and non-repudiation with a model of the 
SUT and identifies whether the specified or intended security features hold in the model. SUT is a test model that is built 
from informal requirements, one execution trace of such a model acts as a test case: input and expected output. It can 
generate an infinite number of tests, in order to reduce them a test selection criteria are applied [43]. 
c. Code-Based Testing and Static Analysis 
Static analysis is dealing with detecting the vulnerabilities from the program code, which is an important task to do as it helps 
in removing the vulnerabilities at early stage of the development [44]. Analyzing the source code can be done manually or 
automated. The manual approach can be done by an expert who has a good experience on the implementation and security, 
the results of the analysis is send back to the developers to fix the identified vulnerabilities. The automatic approach, also 
called Static Application Security Testing (SAST) [45], is a tool analyses the program code of a software component 
automatically and reports potential security problems. 
d. Vulnerabilities Scanning 
A tool scans the executing application software for input and output of known patterns that are associated with known 
vulnerabilities. An example of it is signature-based scanning, which is used for web server, database management systems, 
and some operating systems, these vulnerability patterns, or ”signatures”, are comparable to the signatures searched for by 
virus scanners, or the ”dangerous coding constructs” searched for by automated source code scanner, making the 
vulnerability scanner, in essence, an automated pattern-matching tool [50]. 
e. Penetration Testing and Dynamic Analysis 
Penetration testing is an application or system is tested from the outside in a setup that is comparable to an actual attack 
from a malicious third party [43], the entity that is conducting the test has potentially only limited information about the system 
under test and is only able to interact with the system’s public interfaces. 
The NIST Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment [46] partitions the penetration testing process 
in four distinct phases: 
1. Planning: define and document the component of the application that are relevant to the test. 
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2. Discovery: discover the external interface and make a vulnerability analysis in which the applicable vulnerability 
classes that match the interface are identified. 
3. Attack: the identified interfaces are tested through a series of attack attempts. 
4. Reporting: documents all findings along with their estimated severances. 
Fuzzy testing is a type pf dynamic testing, that feed the program with a random data until it crashes [47], it is an effective 
technique for finding vulnerabilities in software. 
f. Security Regression Testing 
This technique ensure that changes made to a system do not harm its security, are therefore of high significance and the 
interest in such approaches has steadily increased [48]. The changes may be due to new business needs, new regulations, 
and new technologies. [49] classify regression testing techniques into three categories: test suite minimization, test case 
prioritization and test case selection. 
Test suite minimization seeks to reduce the size of a test suite by eliminating redundant test cases from the test suite.  
Test case prioritization aims at ordering the execution of test cases in the regression test suite based on a criterion.  
Test case selection deals with the problem of selecting a subset of test cases that will be used to test changed parts of 
software [43]. 
6. Summery and Conclusion 
Choosing the suitable secure software development process is a challenging thing for the stakeholder to make the decision 
which one to use without knowing the difference between them.  
This paper surveys a set of secure software development life cycle processes, gives a short overview for each and compare 
between them according to the secure activities included at each phase. The results show that most of them do not include 
the security activities in all the development phases, the processes, MS SDL and CLASP cover more aspects of secure 
software development. 
We also summarized a set of the specification languages used to identify attack in the software with a list of advantages 
and disadvantages for each one.  
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